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h i g h l i g h t s
• Bayoumi and Eichengreen
(1993) raises concerns about a
core–periphery divide pre-EMU.
• Using same estimationmethod, win-
dow and sample, we update their
study post-EMU.
• This paper also proposes a
new over-identifying restriction
core–periphery test.
• The test is used to objectively classify
countries into core and periphery.
• We find that the EMU weakened the
original core–periphery pattern.
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a b s t r a c t
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) establish a EMU core–periphery pattern using 1963–1988 data. We use
same methodology, sample, window length (1989–2015), and a novel over-identifying restriction test
to ask whether the EMU strengthened or weakened the core–periphery pattern. Our results suggest the
latter.
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The seminal paper by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993)
highlights the existence of a core–periphery pattern in the run-
up to the European Monetary Union (EMU). If persistent, this
pattern would be detrimental to the EMU project. Using pre-EMU
data to estimate the degree of supply shocks synchronization,
they argue that there is a core (Germany, France, Belgium,
Netherlands andDenmark)where shocks are highly correlated and
le under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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synchronization is significantly lower.
The objective of this paper is to revisit Bayoumi and Eichen-
green (1993) in order to evaluate the effect of the EMU on the
core–periphery pattern they find using 1963–1988 data. We use
the same estimation methodology, sample, and time window
(25 years) to replicate their results for 1989–2015.We askwhether
the EMU strengthened or weakened the core–periphery pattern.
Based on a new over-identifying restriction test, our results sug-
gest that the core–periphery pattern has actually weakened.
2. Theory
The main research question driving the scholarship on optimal
currency areas (OCA) regards the costs and benefits of sharing
a currency (Alesina and Barro, 2002). The main cost is the
loss of monetary policy autonomy, while the main benefits
are transaction costs and exchange rate uncertainty reductions,
and increasing price transparency, trade and competition. OCA
theory stresses labour mobility, product diversification and trade
openness as criteria while debating the endogeneity of currency
unions (Frankel and Rose, 1998). Recent work highlights the role
of credibility shocks: with varying degrees of commitment (time
inconsistency), countries with dissimilar credibility shocks should
join currency unions (Chari et al., 2015). A second relevant recent
strand highlights situations in which OCA criteria are modelled as
interdependent. For instance, Farhi and Werning (2015) focus on
interactions between openness and mobility. Recent econometric
evidence showing the absence of a robust effect of currency unions
on trade raises caveats to the discussion above (Glick and Rose,
2016).
3. Estimation
The methodology used by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993)
is an extension of the Blanchard and Quah (1989) procedure for
decomposing permanent and temporary shocks. Consider a system
where the truemodel is represented by an infinite moving average
of a (vector) of variables, Xt , and shocks, ϵt . Using the lag operator L,
a bi-variate VAR featuring real GDP and its deflator can be written
as an infinitemoving average representation of demand and supply
disturbances:
Xt = A0ϵt + A1ϵt−1 + A2ϵt−2 + A3ϵt−3 + · · · =
∞
i=0
LiAiϵt (1)
where Xt = [1yt ,1pt ] and the matrices A represent the impulse
response functions of the shocks to the elements of X . It follows
that
1yt
1pt

=
∞
i=0
Li

a11i a12i
a21i a22i
 
ϵdt
ϵst

(2)
where yt and pt represent the logarithm of output and prices and
ϵt are i.i.d. disturbances, which identify supply and demand shocks
(Ramey, forthcoming). For the ith country, a11i represents element
a11, in matrix Ai and so on.
This framework implies that supply shocks have permanent
effects on output, while demand shocks have temporary effects.
Both have permanent (opposite) effects on prices. The cumulative
effect of demand shocks on the change in output must be zero:
∞
i=0
a11i = 0. (3)
Using the standard relation between theVAR’s residuals (et ) and
demand and supply shocks, i.e. et = Cϵt for each country, exact
identification of the C matrix requires four restrictions. Two are
normalizations, which define the variance of the shocks ϵdt and ϵst .
The third restriction is from assuming that demand and supplyshocks are orthogonal to each other. The fourth that demand
shocks have only temporary effects on output (Eq. (3)).
Based on the standardAD-ASmodel, there is one restriction that
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) do not impose as theirmodelwas
exactly identified. Here we extend their framework by imposing a
fifth, additional over-identifying restriction and we explicitly test
for a permanent effect of supply shocks on output by imposing∞
i=0 a12i = γ , where γ > 0. Accordingly, demand in each country
is restricted to respond to supply shocks qualitatively (sign) and
quantitatively (size) in the sameway. In terms of the structural VAR
analysis, this implies:
∞
i=1

d11i d12i
d21i d22i
 
c11 c12
c21 c22

=

0 γ
. .

. (4)
We do not restrict γ a priori; instead, we vary γ in the interval
[0.1, 2] and choose its value optimally, as explained below (the
number we chose to report is γ = 1.)
3.1. Testing for over-identifying restriction
In order to test for the over-identifying restriction described
above, we estimate Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) SVARmodel.
Differently from them, we bootstrap the original VAR residuals in
a i.i.d. fashion and generate K = 10.000 data sets. For each of
the kth samples we test for the over-identifying restriction based
on a LR-test. We record the number of rejections (NoR) of the
over-identifying restriction test at each bootstrap replication, and
calculate
NoRi = 100×
K
k=1

NoR = 1
−2 (Lr − Lu) > χ2q− n2−n2 

i,k
K
(5)
where Lu and Lr are the maximized values of the (Gaussian) log
likelihood function of the unrestricted and restricted regressions,
respectively. Under H0, the LR statistic has an asymptotic
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of
long-run restrictions (q) minus (n2 − n)/2, where n is the VAR-
dimension (in this case n = 2). We calculate NoRi for different
values of γ .
Based on the results in Table 2A (cf. Appendix A), we chose
the value of γ which minimizes the total number of rejections
in our sample. Demand and supply shocks are then retrieved by
bootstrap, specifically by recalculating the VAR parameters (K =
10.000), identifying the SVAR and considering median values of
structural disturbances under γ = 1.
4. Results
Fig. 1 shows our main results. The residuals (median boot-
strapped) are retrieved from a Structural VAR with two lags for
all countries, no constant, and using yearly data with respect
to Germany closely following Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993).
The over-identifying restriction is imposed and the sample is
1989–2015. As dispersion has decreased compared to the pre-EMU
era, we argue the results suggest the core–periphery pattern has
weakened after 1989.
Based on the bootstrapped VAR, we test for the over-identifying
restriction described above where (non) rejection supports clas-
sifying the country as periphery (centre). The four countries for
which the rejection of the over-identifying restriction is stronger,
at conventional significance levels, are Ireland, Spain, Greece
and Portugal (Table 2A in the Appendix A).1 Without impos-
ing this over-identifying restriction for these four countries, the
1 The UK shows an ambiguous development: higher correlation of supply shocks
but lower correlation of demand shocks.
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identifying restriction (bootstrapped residuals—median values). Note: This figure
reportsmedian bootstrapped residuals based on 10.000VAR replications. Structural
residuals are retrieved from a SVAR where the over-identifying restriction above is
imposed for all countries. The sample for this SVAR is 1989–2015, with two lags for
all countries and no constant as in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). The demand
and supply disturbances correlation coefficients vis-vis Germany are reported in
Appendix A Table 3A.
core–periphery pattern in Bayoumi and Eichengreen’s terms actu-
ally weakens even further. When the over-identifying restriction
is not imposed, Ireland and Portugal move down the demand-axis
and Greece and Spain jump to the left (Fig. 2).
Overall, our results support a re-interpretation of the core–
periphery pattern: after EMU a new, smaller periphery emerges
(Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece) and its dynamics is systemat-
ically different from the rest in that, for these countries, the over-
identifying restriction is rejected by the data in most cases.
One important concern is that the relationship between
demand and supplymay have changed over time and/or the nature
of shocks has been altered by the EMU itself. Hence, a structural
identification on economic variables thatmay have changed can be
misleading. One can argue that the increase in correlation in supply
disturbances may be due to a larger role for oil price shocks in the
sample. Proponents of using the nominal price of oil in empirical
models of the transmission of oil price shocks tend to conclude that
there is no stable dynamic relationship between percent changes
in the nominal price of oil and inflation. There is evidence fromFig. 2. Correlation of supply and demand disturbances (bootstrapped residuals—
median values) relaxing the over-identifying restriction. Note: This figure reports
median bootstrapped residuals based on 10.000 VAR replications. Structural
residuals are retrieved from a SVAR where the over-identifying restriction above
is imposed for all countries, with the exception of Ireland, Spain, Greece and
Portugal. The sample for this SVAR is 1989–2015, with two lags for all countries
and no constant as in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). The demand and supply
disturbances correlation coefficients are reported in Appendix A Table 4A.
in-sample fitting exercises, however, of a predictive relationship
between suitable nonlinear transformations of the nominal price
of oil and real output. Themost successful of these transformations
is the Net Oil Price Increase (NOPI) measure fromHamilton (2003).
Let st denote the nominal price of oil in logs, then
NOPI t =
st −max (st−1, st−37)
if st −max (st−1, st−37) > 0
0 otherwise.
(6)
The net oil price increase is a censored predictor that assigns
zero weight to net oil price decreases and singles out oil prices
peaks in a 36-month (or shorter) window. To construct a Net
Oil Price Index, we use the Brent Europe crude oil price index
at a monthly frequency and identify the net increases (Fig. 3).
Based on this characterization, we define dummy variables at a
yearly frequency. In particular, we identify the following net oil
increases {1996, 1999, 2000, 2004–2008}. When conditioning the
VAR on the NOPI, we find little evidence that this is relevant in
this framework and that the responses of real GDP and inflationFig. 3. Net oil price increases indicator.
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identifying restriction and conditional on NOPI (bootstrapped residuals—median
values). Note: This figure reports median bootstrapped residuals based on 10.000
VAR replications. Structural residuals are retrieved from a SVAR where the over-
identifying restriction above is imposed for all countries, with the exception of
Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal. The sample for this SVAR is 1989–2015, with
two lags for all countries and no constant as in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993).
The SVAR is conditional on NOPI dummies (cf. Results’ section).
to demand and supply innovations are driven by net oil price
increases (results also remain broadly unchanged if we use the
change in the price of oil as exogenous variable instead) (see Fig. 4).
5. Conclusions
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) is a seminal paper because,
inter alia, it is one of the first to point out the risks ofan entrenched core–periphery to the then nascent EMU. Their
influential diagnosticswas based upon data covering 25 years from
1963 to 1988. Using the same methodology, sample, and time
window, this paper replicates their results for 1989–2015. We ask
whether the EMU strengthened or weakened the core–periphery
pattern. Using a new over-identifying restriction test, our results
suggest the EMU has significantly weakened the original pattern
described in Bayoumi and Eichengreen, in that we find, based on
demand and supply shocks, changes in the clustering of countries.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary material related to this article can be found
online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.040.
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